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The International Campaign for 
Justice in Bhopal (ICJB), a global coali-
tion led by four Bhopal gas disaster sur-
vivors’ groups and one Bhopal-based 
support group, uses the slogan, “We all 
live in Bhopal” to indicate the global 
battle against the toxic trespass of our 
bodies and environments by hazard-
ous industries. This is of particular rel-
evance in Kanawha Valley—also known 
as “Chemical Valley”2—West Virginia 
(WV). Kanawha Valley, and particular-
ly the community of Institute,3 shares 
a historic connection with Bhopal, In-
dia—the site of the world’s worst indus-
trial disaster—and as in Bhopal, resi-
dents have dealt with toxic emissions 
for decades. 
In the following, we detail the 
separate, but interconnected, histories 
of these two landmark struggles. In 
doing so, we demonstrate that diverse 
communities facing environmental rac-
ism—like those of Bhopal, India and 
Institute, WV—have formed sustained 
relationships of solidarity through 
struggle. This solidarity is demonstrat-
ed through the exchanges of support 
for one another’s local struggle, framed 
within the broader scope of the struggle 
for environmental justice. This transna-
tional solidarity challenges the increas-
ing power of multinational corporations 
(MNC’s) within a neoliberal system—a 
system that undermines the health and 
well-being of (primarily racialized, 
Indigenous and/or poor) populations 
worldwide.4
Bhopal, India
In 1969, the Union Carbide Cor-
poration’s Indian subsidiary, Union 
Carbide India Limited, constructed a 
chemical facility in Bhopal, the capital 
city of Madhya Pradesh, India. The fa-
cility was 50.9% owned by the Ameri-
can-owned Union Carbide Corporation 
(Hanna, Morehouse and Sarangi xxiv). 
In effect, the parent corporation held ul-
timate decision-making authority over 
the plant’s maintenance and operation. 
The purpose of the facility was to for-
mulate and later manufacture pesticides 
for India’s Green Revolution, marking a 
shift to the use of mechanized agricul-
ture, GMOs, chemical-based fertilizers 
and pesticides (Morehouse and Mathur 
27-28). 
Union Carbide’s US-based officials 
approved the utilization of untested 
technology (“Carbide’s internal docu-
ments” 19-20), instituted cost-cutting 
measures that resulted in a slew of 
safety hazards, and hazardously stored 
methyl isocyanate (MIC) (ICFTU-ICEF 
28-35)—a substance more toxic than 
phosgene (Rajagopal 24). 
Notably, the facility was sited in the 
poorest subsection of Bhopal, known 
as Old Bhopal. Old Bhopal is comprised 
largely of daily wage earners, and mi-
grants from rural areas (displaced as 
a result of the Green Revolution, and 
other projects) (Sarangi, "The move-
ment in Bhopal . . ." 101). In addition, 
a large portion of the population iden-
tifies as Muslim and scheduled-caste 
Hindu—both of whom are marginalized 
in the Indian context (Hanna 6). ICJB 
community mobilizer, Hazira Bi—who 
resides in the severely impacted local-
ity of Jai Prakash Nagar—notes, “When 
the gas leaked it poisoned the area close 
to Union Carbide… all the places where 
A message to the people of Bhopal: We are writing you from the shadow of the Union Car-
bide plant at Institute, West Virginia. We are residents, professors and college students who 
oppose MIC [methyl isocyanate] production in our community. Like you, we are people who 
need industry for jobs, and for the products that make our lives better. Like you, we now 
know that safety and health come first. May our common concern bond your community 
and ours for many years to come.
– Estella Chandler, People Concerned About MIC (now called People Concerned 
About Chemical Safety),1 August 18th, 1985 (Chemical Valley).
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the poor live. There is certainly a rea-
son why only the poor were allotted 
land near a dangerous factory like UCC” 
(Scandrett et al. 141).
Labour unions fought long and 
hard to improve the deteriorating safe-
ty conditions within the facility, and the 
routine exposure of workers to hazard-
ous chemicals (Ranjhi 12). However, 
worker’s demands were routinely ig-
nored by Union Carbide’s American and 
Indian officials. On December 26th, 
1981, a maintenance worker named Mo-
hammed Ashraf was killed. Ashraf, who 
was not provided with PVC overalls, 
was splashed with phosgene as a result 
of a malfunctioning valve. In a panic, 
he removed his mask, resulting in the 
inhalation of a large quantity of phos-
gene. Seventy-two hours later, Ashraf 
was dead (Chouhan 34). Absolving their 
responsibility, Union Carbide officials 
noted, “It is a matter of regret that be-
cause of unmindful removal of safety 
mask before decontaminating himself, 
Mr. Ashraf Mohd. Khan suffered expo-
sure to toxic gas” (Chakravarty 13).
Ashraf’s death did little to improve 
safety in the facility. In January 1982, 
a phosgene leak hospitalized 24 work-
ers (none of whom had been ordered 
to wear protective masks), and in Feb-
ruary 1982, a MIC leak impacted 18 
workers (Eckerman 38). In May 1982, a 
safety audit found 61 hazards (30 major 
and 11 in the MIC and phosgene units); 
however, no action was taken to reme-
diate these hazards (Hanna, Morehouse 
and Sarangi xxiv). In August 1982, a 
chemical engineer was exposed to liq-
uid MIC, resulting in burns to over 30% 
of his body (Eckerman 38). In Septem-
ber 1982, Union Carbide dismantled the 
siren warning system to prevent the ad-
jacent communities from being alerted 
to toxic leaks. A month later, a chemical 
leak resulted in the hospitalization of 
hundreds of residents in the neighbour-
ing communities (Hanna, Morehouse 
and Sarangi xxiv). The MIC supervisor, 
who attempted to stop this leak, expe-
rienced major chemical burns, while 
two other workers were severely ex-
posed (Eckerman 39). Following this 
leak, the workers’ union circulated fly-
ers in the adjacent communities, warn-
ing: “Beware of Fatal Accidents”, “Lives 
of thousands of workers and citizens in 
danger because of poisonous gas” and 
“Spurt of accidents in the factory, safety 
measures deficient” (ICFTU-ICEF 35). 
Union Carbide’s response was to ban 
all political and union meetings inside 
the factory, and soon after, they laid off 
union leaders (Eckerman 39).
Moreover, between 1983 and 1984, 
major cost-cutting measures were insti-
tuted. The MIC unit saw a reduction in 
staffing from twelve to six, and safety 
training was reduced from six months 
to 15 days. In addition, safety manuals 
were re-written to permit the shutting 
down of two safety systems when the 
plant was not in operation (ICJB, “What 
Happened in Bhopal?”). It is this blatant 
neglect of health and safety that led to 
the world’s worst industrial disaster. 
On December 3rd, 1984, 40 tons of 
MIC leaked from Union Carbide’s Old 
Bhopal-based facility (Hanna, More-
house and Sarangi 3). Approximately 
500,000 people were exposed, and up 
to 10,000 were killed within three days 
(Amnesty, 30 years is too long . . . 2). Re-
calling the night of the disaster, Resham 
Bi—a resident of the severely impacted 
community of Jai Prakash Nagar—notes, 
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Was it an unavoidable accident? Or an ‘accident’ at all? 
Carbide acted in a rather peculiar manner, responding to the death of Ashraf Khan by in-
tensifying their cost-cutting in the most dangerous areas of the plant.  The workforce was 
halved. The crew of the MIC unit was slashed from twelve to six, and its maintenance staff 
from six to two. Safety training was reduced from six months to two weeks, reduced in ef-
fect to slogans (but the slogans were in English so the workers couldn’t understand them 
anyway). There were so many small leaks that the alarm siren was turned off to avoid incon-
veniencing the neighbours. In case of repairs, old parts were recycled instead. Managers were 
still looking for things to cut. There was nothing left. Or was there?  The Carbide bosses then 
remembered the three giant tanks of MIC. As a probable consequence all the safety systems 
failed to keep the deadly MIC from losing temper that night.
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[P]eople started coughing, choking, 
and were feeling burning sensation in 
their eyes. Children started fainting… 
I felt like somebody was burning chili 
peppers… Many people died from 
my community. People have died 
due to cancer, and stomach diseases. 
Even today, people are suffering… I
gave birth to two children after the 
disaster, they both were born dead.
Similarly, survivor-activist, Nafisa Bi, 
shares: “My sister’s son… was one and a 
half years old then… There was… green 
foam coming out of his mouth when he 
died… I can’t even talk about the bod-
ies that I had seen at the station. There 
were many… When that scene comes 
into my mind, I get angry…”
Immediately after the Bhopal gas 
disaster, protests took place. Within 
a week, approximately thirty leftist, 
middle-class activists from other parts 
of Bhopal and India arrived in the im-
pacted communities. These external 
activists founded structured movement 
groups, which focused on the short-
term goals of relief and rehabilitation, 
and the long-term goals of justice and 
accountability. Although some local 
activists were involved in these early 
groups, the external activists played 
a dominant role. By the end of 1986, 
most of these external leaders had left 
Bhopal, resulting in survivor-led groups 
assuming much of the movement’s lead-
ership (Sarangi, "The movement in Bho-
pal . . ." 101-108).
Thirty-two years later, the strug-
gle goes on, with survivors’ groups—
namely, (1) Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila 
Stationery Karmchari Sangh (Bhopal gas-
affected women workers’ stationery 
union, formed in 1986); (2) Bhopal Gas 
Peedit Mahila Purush Sangharsh Mor-
cha (Bhopal gas-affected women’s and 
men’s front, formed in 2004); (3) Bhopal 
Gas Peedit Nirashrit Pension Bhogi Sang-
harsh Morcha (Bhopal gas-affected des-
titute pensioners’ front, which formed 
prior to 1981);5 (4) Children against 
Dow-Carbide (formed in 1987); and (5) 
The Bhopal Group for Information and 
Action (formed in 1986)—continuing to 
lead the struggle, and demand “no more 
Bhopals” worldwide through their ac-
tivist work. These distinct groups form 
the leadership of ICJB, which functions 
under the guiding aims of: (1) The pre-
cautionary principle; (2) The polluter 
pays principle; (3) Community right-to-
know; (4) International liability; and (5) 
Environmental justice (ICJB, “Mission 
Statement and Guiding Principles”). 
Within these larger aims lie the goals 
of social and economic rehabilitation, 
healthcare and medical research, ad-
equate compensation, environmental 
remediation, and legal recourse—all 
aimed at the State government of Mad-
hya Pradesh, the Government of In-
dia, and the Dow Chemical Company 
(which bought the Union Carbide Cor-
poration in 2001) (ICJB, “Campaign for 
Justice”).
In the initial years following the 
disaster, Bhopali groups formed rela-
tionships of solidarity with American 
environmental justice (EJ) struggles. 
According to Pam Nixon—spokesper-
son and president for the Institute, 
WV-based EJ group, People Concerned 
About Chemical Safety—Bhopali sur-
vivors visited Institute, WV in 1989, 
while on a toxic tour of the United 
States. Satinath Sarangi, co-leader of the 
Bhopal Group for Information and Ac-
tion, elaborates:
In 1989 the Bhopal survivors/sup-
porters’ tour went to the toxic 
hotspots such as landfills, chemi-
cal and petrochemical factories and 
Superfund sites in 14 states… In an 
overwhelming number of places the 
victims of industrial pollution were 
people of color and poor white com-
munities. The Bhopal group partici-
pated in several rallies, non-violent 
protests and media events in sup-
port of issues of environmental jus-
tice and the hosts, in turn, pledged 
to lend solidarity to the struggle in 
Bhopal that they said was their own. 
The exchange of solidarity between 
Bhopal organizations and EJ orga-
nizations in the United States con-
tinued for a little over two years... 
According to Sarangi, relationships 
with U.S. based EJ groups proved diffi-
cult to sustain. However, the relation-
ship between Bhopali survivors and 
residents of Institute, WV has proven 
most long-lasting, as is evidenced by 
the numerous occasions in which Bho-
pali survivors and solidarity activists 
have visited Institute, WV, and the on-
going commemoration of the Bhopal 
disaster by People Concerned (through 
film screenings, public discussions, and 
other events). Sue Davis, a long-time 
People Concerned member, shared one 
memorable action: 
I found out that [the chemical com-
panies] sponsor this other [commu-
nity safety] group… They sponsor 
them! … We were intending to make 
our voice heard that night at their 
meeting… I had gone over there ear-
lier, and I saw where they had their 
table up, and they had their easel 
for their display... So I told the jani-
tor... “We'll need a table on this side 
too, and we need an easel over here 
too”. I just let him think I'm part of 
the [company-sponsored commu-
nity safety group]... and we took all 
of our Bhopal stuff. We took all the 
posters... We set up... right across 
from what the chemical people had… 
and I had pass-outs stapled together 
with all these facts to give to every-
body... I took my old jogging suit... It 
was red... [and] had the United States 
flag on it... I had gone up and bought 
a skeleton... and I put him over there, 
and I said: ‘They didn't tell him in 
time to evacuate’, or something like 
that. He was my Bhopal person… and 
I had all this Bhopal stuff, and I had 
stuff about Dow... So when the people 
came, what could they say to me?... I 
wish they would've said something 
to me. I had a right to be there. I'm 
community. You're doing this under 
the name of the community. I'm com-
munity. So when the people came in... 
I said, “Here's your packet” [laughs]... 
I gave everybody that went inside our 
packet, and that's what you have to do. 
We will now delve more deeply 
into the history of environmental rac-
ism in Kanawha Valley, and the commu-
nity of Institute, WV, in particular.
Kanawha Valley, USA
Kanawha Valley, WV is known as 
“Chemical Valley,” and for good rea-
son. The chemical industry has been 
the prime driver of the region’s econ-
omy for decades. This is rooted in the 
salt industry, which dates back to the 
Delaware tribe, and was later adopted 
by settlers in the region. Salt, and the 
presence of other natural resources, 
provided the necessary resources for a 
thriving chemical industry to develop 
(Cantrell 1-2). Union Carbide’s presence 
in Kanawha Valley dates back to 1920, 
with the construction of the world’s 
first petro-chemical facility in Clen-
denin, WV. By 1923, the company had 
leased 11 acres of land in South Charles-
ton, WV (Union Carbide Corporation).
In 1936, Union Carbide found itself 
at the center of the worst industrial di-
saster in U.S. history—the Hawks Nest 
Tunnel Disaster in Gauley Bridge, WV. 
Due to silica exposure, close to 500 were 
killed, and 1,500 workers were left dis-
abled (Cantrell 5). As in Bhopal,  India, 
Union Carbide neglected safety mea-
sures. Further, Union Carbide actively 
sought Black workers to drill the Hawks 
Nest Tunnel, as “they were considered a 
cheap, pliable labor force” (Rose 38).
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While the Bhopal gas disaster led 
to the questioning of chemical safety 
worldwide, it cast particular light on 
Kanawha Valley. In 1941, Union Car-
bide purchased a facility in Institute, 
WV (Agarwal, Merrifield and Tandon 
11). Institute is a predominantly Black 
community, and home to the histori-
cally Black university, West Virginia 
State University. As Bullard contends, 
“African American communities in the 
South… have been routinely targeted for 
the siting of noxious facilities; locally 
unwanted land uses… and environmen-
tal hazards. People in these communi-
ties, in turn, are likely to suffer greater 
environmental and health risks…” (xv). 
In fact, the foundational work of the 
United Church of Christ’s Commission 
for Racial Justice (UCC-CRJ) and Bul-
lard, Mohai, Saha, and Wright contend 
that race is a prime factor in the siting 
of hazardous industries and waste, with 
the latter indicating, “racial disparities 
in the distribution of commercial haz-
ardous wastes are greater than previ-
ously reported… [P]eople of color make 
up the majority of those living in host 
neighborhoods within 3 kilometers of 
the nation’s hazardous waste facilities” 
(152). Aside from Institute, poor and 
working class white neighbourhoods 
also surround the Institute facility, a 
perspective of environmental (in)- 
justice that is common throughout West 
Virginia and Appalachia.
Importantly, UCC-CRJ’s work led 
to the First National People of Color 
Leadership Summit in 1991, which, in 
turn, led to then President Bill Clinton's 
Executive Order 12898 on Environ-
mental Justice (Orum, Moore, Roberts 
and Sanchez 4). While little has been 
achieved since this Executive Order, it 
is notable that EJ groups across the U.S., 
in harms way of chemical facilities, re-
fer to the Bhopal gas disaster as a defini-
tive moment in history, necessitating 
chemical policy reforms:
For almost 30 years since the Bho-
pal disaster, chemical facilities, Con-
gress, and a series of Presidential 
Administrations have neglected the 
potential for toxic disaster that mil-
lions of Americans—who are dis-
proportionately Black, Latino, and 
low income—live with every day. 
While some companies have ad-
opted safer alternatives, thousands 
of similar facilities have not. (Orum, 
Moore, Roberts and Sanchez 3)
Although Union Carbide’s Bhopal, 
India facility was considered the “sis-
ter plant” of Union Carbide’s Institute, 
WV facility, safety precautions were 
more advanced in the Institute facility 
(Agarwal). In fact, “Several weeks be-
fore deadly methyl isocyanate leaked 
from a Union Carbide Corp. plant in 
Bhopal, India, the company revised op-
erating procedures at its Institute, WV 
plant to help prevent a similar accident 
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Did you rather your bundle of joy die in 
your arms than live a life benumbed? 
Almost half of all pregnant women ex-
posed to Carbide’s gas spontaneously 
aborted. For women living within 1km 
of the plant, 43% delivered stillborn 
babies. Of 486 live births, 14% died in 
the first 30 days. In 1985, 1 in 3 babies 
survived. However, women’s gynaeco-
logical problems were systematically 
denied and time and again ascribed as 
‘faking’, ‘psychological,’ or due to ‘pov-
erty’ or ‘poor’ hygiene. Women have 
also spoken of indifferent doctors, large 
mouthed politicians, and predatory 
touts. Humiliation for all lurks in every 
nook and cranny. 
‘Yeh bhi gas kaand ka baccha paida hua 
hai,’ (Here is another child of the gas 
tragedy). Bhopal’s second disaster. 
Kokila Bhattacharya
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there” (Winslow 6). Nevertheless, In-
stitute, WV has been ridden with toxic 
emissions for decades. “[R]esidents in 
the small, predominantly black, town… 
remembered frightening incidents… in-
cluding an explosion and evacuation of 
the community in June 1954. Workers 
recalled a series of fires, explosions and 
leaks and their own exposures to MIC 
gas” (Agarwal, Merrifield and Tandon 
11). Sue Davis, of People Concerned, 
shared her memories of the 1954 explo-
sion:
[W]e were sitting at the movie the-
ater… and we were watching Birds 
of Paradise… [I]n Birds of Paradise, 
there was a volcano that erupted... 
[and] at the exact moment that that 
volcano erupted, they burst into 
flames over [at the plant]... We had 
no idea that they had something over 
[there] that could burst into flames 
or affect us in any way… [W]e didn't 
know what to do. You looked at the 
windows and everything outside 
was red… and we had no idea what 
it was… [T]he kids were running 
around saying, “It's the end of the 
world! It's the end of the world!”... 
Just pandemonium. It was terrible… 
Notably, ICJB community mobilizer, 
Hazira Bi, recalls a similar sense of pan-
ic following the Bhopal disaster: “[W]e 
were running without any sense of di-
rection… The children were groaning so 
much that we just picked them up in our 
arms and joined the masses of people. 
Believe me it seemed like the end of the 
world!” (Mukherjee 47).
Institute, WV residents understood 
that MIC, which killed up to 10,000 Bho-
palis (Amnesty, 30 years is too long . . . 
2) was being produced in their commu-
nity. Further, it was revealed that Union 
Carbide’s Institute, WV facility had 
leaked MIC 28 times between 1979 and 
1984. Later, Union Carbide admitted 
to 62 MIC leaks (Agarwal, Merrifield 
and Tandon 11). In response, citizens’ 
groups like People Concerned emerged. 
Sue Davis discussed the founding of the 
group and her brother, Warne Fergu-
son’s, pivotal role:
He got very upset after the Bhopal in-
cident… He virtually founded [People 
Concerned], even though you had 
a lot of people who worked on that 
original committee... He went to Don 
Wilson, this young man that lives 
in West Dunbar... and said, “Don, 
we've got to do something”. They, in 
turn, went to Ed Hoffman, who was 
at [West Virginia State University]... 
So, that's when it started, but it did 
start because of Warne. He was just 
upset about it, and he remained ac-
tive until his health started failing…
While Union Carbide officials as-
sured Institute, WV residents that MIC 
was being produced and stored safely, 
on August 11th, 1985, a cloud of aldi-
carb oxime, containing trace amounts 
of MIC and methylene chloride—a 
neurotoxin and suspected carcino-
gen—leaked from the facility. Union 
Carbide officials waited 20 minutes 
before informing authorities of the 
leak, resulting in the hospitalization of 
135 residents (Fortun 60). Pam Nixon, 
spokesperson and president for People 
Concerned, recalls, “They said there 
wasn't [any long-term health effects]6… 
[There were] so many chemicals... if it 
had been one particular chemical, you 
would have known... what the health ef-
fect would have been… I had respiratory 
problems. Immediately people were 
having respiratory problems… I was one 
of the 135 that ended up going to a medi-
cal clinic.”
Following this leak, People Con-
cerned organized a town hall meeting, 
attended by Institute, WV residents and 
Union Carbide’s then President, Robert 
Kennedy. Residents voiced their anger 
and frustration. At the meeting, People 
Concerned member, Donna Willis, re-
marked,
You fumble and stumble, and cause 
our lives to be turned upside down... 
It wasn’t the emergency whistle. 
It was the fire whistle, and fire-
men were running to get a fire. As 
they ran for the fire, I was run-
ning out of Institute with my two 
kids. Trying to save the lives that 
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I put here on earth, not for Car-
bide to take away! (Chemical Valley)
In 1986, Union Carbide’s Institute, 
WV facility was acquired by Rhone-
Poulenc, and later, Aventis CropScience, 
followed by Bayer CropScience. Despite 
changes in ownership, the Institute fa-
cility has continued patterns of fugi-
tive emissions. In May 1993, a chlorine 
leak led to a shelter-in-place warning—a 
largely ineffective “safety” measure—
for 1,000 residents (Ward, “Plant’s 
History Rocky”), and in August 1993, 
residents again adhered to a shelter-in-
place warning after an explosion at the 
facility (Associated Press). This explo-
sion killed two workers (Ward, “Bayer 
Cited . . .”). In June 1994, untreated 
wastewater leaked into the Kanawha 
River, and in December 1994, a sulfur 
dichloride leak injured one worker. In 
February 1996, a toluene leak led to an-
other shelter-in-place advisory, and in 
July 1997, a small amount of MIC was 
released from the facility. In October 
1999, residents in a two-mile radius 
adhered to yet another shelter-in-place 
advisory following a phosgene leak, and 
in 2001, ten workers required medical 
care following a chloroform leak (Ward, 
“Plant’s History Rocky”).
For 26 years following the Bhopal 
disaster, Institute, WV was the only 
place in the U.S. that continued to stock-
pile such large quantities of MIC—as 
much as 200,000 pounds (CSB 142). On 
August 28th, 2008, there was another 
explosion in the same unit as the Au-
gust 1993 explosion, 70 feet away from 
an above-ground tank containing 6,700 
gallons of MIC (CSB 7). One worker 
died instantly, and another within two 
months. At this time, the company was 
owned by Bayer CropScience; and, re-
gardless of the giant fireball and cloud 
of smoke, Bayer officials declared con-
fidence that no MIC escaped the fence-
line (Ward, “Bayer Knew MIC Monitors 
. . .”). However, a 2009 Congressional 
investigation, prompted by Bayer’s se-
crecy, noted,
Air monitoring devices designed to 
determine whether MIC has been 
released into the air were not op-
erational on the night of the explo-
sion. Video cameras positioned to 
capture the site of explosion did 
not record the time period of explo-
sion because they had been discon-
nected from the recording unit. (U.S. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce)
Additionally, plant workers were in-
structed to manually bypass safety 
procedures (CSB 1), as they rushed to 
resume operations following a main-
tenance shutdown. The Congressional 
investigation determined that “the con-
sequences could have eclipsed the 1984 
disaster in India” (Ward, “Congres-
sional Report . . .”). The U.S. Chemical 
Safety and Hazards Investigation Board 
(CSB) recommended that the Kanawha 
Valley develop a prevention program as 
a result of the chronic issues with haz-
ardous chemical releases (CSB 116).
In May 2009, Rachna Dhingra (co-
leader of the Bhopal Group for Infor-
mation and Action), along with Sarita 
Malviya (founding member of Children 
Against Dow-Carbide), and Safreen 
Khan (leader of Children against Dow-
Carbide), visited the U.S. as part of the 
25th Anniversary Bhopal Survivors’ 
Tour. They met with groups across the 
U.S., in hopes of spurring U.S. govern-
mental action to hold Dow Chemical, 
the U.S. based company responsible 
for the disaster, accountable. People 
Concerned invited the tour to Institute, 
WV, where community members gave 
the visitors a toxic tour of the "Chemi-
cal Valley," as they had done in 1989. 
Later that evening, the young Bhopali 
women shared their personal experi-
ences at a forum held at the West Vir-
ginia State University in Institute. Both 
Khan and Malviya spoke of living near 
the Union Carbide site, and being forced 
to consume groundwater contaminated 
as a result of the polluting practices of 
Union Carbide. The young women high-
lighted an all too possible reality for 
residents of the Kanawha Valley, who, 
at the time, still lived in the shadow of 
another Bhopal disaster, 25 years later. 
As Malviya noted, “We have to learn 
from what happened in Bhopal. We fear 
that the company operating here, Bayer, 
will make a second Bhopal here" (Steel-
hammer).
In addition, members of People 
Concerned worked with ICJB to coordi-
nate meetings with West Virginia Sena-
tor Robert C. Byrd’s office, the CSB, and 
Senator Henry Waxman’s office. Wax-
man was a California Democrat who 
in 1985 called for a U.S. government 
inquiry into the Bhopal disaster. This 
resulted in U.S. legislation regarding the 
accidental release of toxic chemicals in 
the U.S. (Agarwal). In these meetings, 
the Bhopali representatives, with their 
U.S. grassroots allies, sought a Congres-
sional hearing on accountability for 
Bhopal. To date, no such hearing has oc-
curred.
In August 2009, three months af-
ter Khan, Malviya, and Dhingra visited 
Institute, WV, Bayer CropScience an-
nounced a $25 million USD project to 
upgrade the Institute facility and re-
duce the MIC stockpile by 80% (Ward, 
“Bayer to Cut Institute . . .”). Further, 
in February 2011, Bayer announced its 
intention to restart MIC production at 
the Institute, WV plant (Hohmann). 
In response, impacted citizens (many 
of whom were members of People Con-
cerned) filed a lawsuit to prevent the 
restarting of the unit, until safety mea-
sures identified by the CSB were put in 
place. The residents cited the Bhopal gas 
disaster as the catastrophic potential, 
and invited a prominent Bhopali sur-
vivor-activist, Sanjay Verma—who lost 
seven members of his immediate family 
in the Bhopal gas disaster—to testify as 
an expert witness on the effects of MIC, 
on behalf of People Concerned. The 
day before the trial seeking a perma-
nent injunction began, Bayer retracted 
their decision to restart MIC production 
(ICJB, “Sanjay Verma, Bhopal Survivor, 
Tours the U.S.”), and People Concerned 
about MIC became People Concerned 
About Chemical Safety. In March 2015, 
Bayer announced that it was divest-
ing from the Institute, WV facility, and 
returning the site’s ownership back 
to Union Carbide Corporation (Ward, 
“Bayer Sells Institute . . .”).
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'Are we less than human?'
2005
Our fight for clean water and life. The 
government had sat for so many years 
on UC's cash [from the settlement] that 
the sum in the bank with interest had 
multiplied threefold.
Then they decided to give a lot of it to 
the state government, which had done 
nothing for us.
Entering the Gas Relief and ask to meet 
the minister.
We wait singing songs. Three truckloads 
of armed riot police turn up.
The cops are kicking out, hitting really 
hard with thick sticks. You are trying to 
get my children out of that place and 
see an activist dragged by his hair all the 
way downstairs and later beaten with 
sticks.
Kokila Bhattacharya
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32 years on…
Thirty-two years later, the struggle 
continues, making ICJB and People Con-
cerned contemporary EJ struggles. Sur-
vivors of the Bhopal gas disaster con-
tinue to lead a relentless fight for their 
rights to medical care and research, 
social and economic rehabilitation, 
adequate compensation, a toxic-free 
environment, and justice, accountabil-
ity and recognition in the Indian and 
American courts. The Dow Chemical 
Company’s acquisition of Union Car-
bide in 2001 complicated the struggle, 
as Dow Chemical vehemently denies all 
responsibility for the Bhopal gas disas-
ter, despite inheriting Union Carbide’s 
assets and liabilities (ICJB, “Dow’s Li-
abilities”).
As a result of the Bhopal disaster, 
approximately 25,000 people have died 
(Sarangi, "Compensation to Bhopal gas 
victims . . ." 118), close to 150,000 are 
facing chronic health problems (Am-
nesty, 30 years is too long . . . 6), and at 
least 22 communities are facing ground-
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water contamination as a result of Union 
Carbide’s polluting practices (Amnesty, 
30 years is too long . . . 10). Satinath Sa-
rangi, of the Bhopal Group for Informa-
tion and Action, notes that there is an 
increase in cancers and tuberculosis. 
This is in addition to a wide array of 
illnesses impacting diverse bodily sys-
tems (respiratory, ocular, neurological, 
neuromuscular, gynecological, repro-
ductive, endocrine, and immune). Fur-
ther, the disaster has had a significant 
impact on mental health (Amnesty, 
Clouds of Injustice . . . 14-17).
Similarly, in Kanawha Valley, the 
struggle continues. In January 2014, 
10,000 gallons of crude 4-methylcy-
clohexane methanol (crude MCHM) 
leaked from a Freedom Industries’ fa-
cility into the Elk River, polluting the 
water supply of 300,000 residents in 
Kanawha Valley, across nine WV coun-
ties (Orum, Moore, Saha and Sanchez 
24), including Institute. Notably, crude 
MCHM was never adequately tested for 
human toxicity. In fact, in the United 
States, thousands of chemicals used in 
everyday products have not been test-
ed. Of the 60,000 chemicals grandfa-
thered in under the 1976 Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (TSCA), only 200 
have been tested for safety, and only 
five have been restricted. Of the 80,000 
chemicals currently available for use in 
the U.S., the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) has only required a 
few to be tested for their safety (Safer 
Chemicals Healthy, Families). While 
a 2016 TSCA reform bill known as the 
"Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safe-
ty for the 21st Century Act" requires 
testing prioritization to include an as-
sessment of disproportionate risk to 
vulnerable populations, its sluggish 
implementation pace means it will have 
little impact on already overburdened 
EJ communities. Such chemical safety 
legislation remains a focal point of the 
U.S. EJ movement.
Shortly after the 2014 Freedom In-
dustries’ spill, the International Cam-
paign for Justice in Bhopal—like People 
Concerned in 1985—released a state-
ment of solidarity, noting the similari-
ties between the Freedom Industries’ 
spill and the Bhopal gas disaster. Name-
ly,
The International Campaign for 
Justice in Bhopal… expresses soli-
darity with the communities of 
West Virginia that are facing a toxic 
nightmare. The Freedom Industries 
chemical spill and the Union Carbide 
Corporation’s (UCC) chemical leak in 
Bhopal, India share many similarities, 
namely: (1) Unsafe design; (2) Un-
safe location; (3) Failure to report to 
official bodies; (4) Denial of the leak 
by the Corporation immediately after 
the incident; (5) Inadequate informa-
tion available on the leaked chemical 
and on an appropriate response, and; 
(6) Government’s negligence in regu-
lation. (“Statement of Solidarity”)
History tells us that Bhopal, India 
and Kanawha Valley, USA are inextrica-
bly connected, and recent events dem-
onstrate that the common concerns that 
first bonded these communities in 1984 
continue to have relevance 32 years lat-
er. Both are marginalized communities, 
battling the toxic trespass of their bod-
ies and environments, and the devalu-
ation of their health and safety, which 
allows toxic facilities to be sited in their 
backyards.
In many ways, the 32-year rela-
tionship of solidarity between ICJB 
and People Concerned represents a 
transnational struggle, which aims to 
challenge the ability of multinational 
corporations and their colluders in 
government to pollute our (racialized, 
Indigenous, and/or poor) bodies, and 
the environments in which we live, 
work, and play. However, as allies and 
advocates, we must ask: What are the 
lived implications of such solidarity? 
Namely, what has it done to increase 
quality of life in Old Bhopal and Insti-
tute, WV, or address these communi-
ties’ respective day-to-day struggles 
amidst routine toxic exposure? In other 
words, what are the implications, if any, 
on-the-ground? Survivors of the Bhopal 
disaster and residents of Institute, WV 
continue to contend with the toxic tres-
pass of their bodies and environments 
decades later. These are vital questions 
to consider.
Still, Old Bhopal, India and Insti-
tute, WV teach us that distinct com-
munities can form long-term bonds of 
solidarity over the shared experience of 
environmental racism. Such supportive 
networks can have significant meaning 
in the long-term, ongoing, and arduous 
battle for environmental justice—be-
yond the potential amplification of voice 
necessary in achieving movement aims 
and campaign goals. As Pam Nixon, 
spokesperson and president for People 
Concerned, shares: “I just want [Bho-
pal survivors] to know never give up. 
They're not in it by themselves. We're 
still fighting here, and we're gonna con-
tinue and for them to do the same.”
Notes
1 To avoid confusion, People Concerned 
About MIC/People Concerned About Chem-
ical Safety will be referred to as ‘People Con-
cerned’ throughout this paper.
2 Editor's Note: "Chemical Valley" in 
Kanawha Valley, USA differs from "Chemi-
cal Valley" surrounding Sarnia, Ontario, 
Canada.
3 Notably, Robert Bullard’s (1990) ground-
breaking work, Dumping In Dixie: Race, Class, 
and Environmental Quality, profiles Institute, 
WV and several other African American 
communities facing environmental racism 
in the Southern United States.
4 Both Shadaan and Nye are solidarity advo-
cates with the Bhopal struggle, while Nye is 
a former neighbouring fenceline resident of 
the Institute facility and former spokesper-
son of the Institute-based EJ struggle, People 
Concerned About Chemical Safety. As such, 
the article is written from the perspective of 
active allies of the Bhopal struggle, and, in 
Nye’s case, an insider of the West Virginia 
struggle. In effect, some of the information 
presented in this article is based on our ex-
periences of observing and participating in 
these movements.
5 According to Balkrishna Namdeo of the 
Bhopal gas-affected destitute pensioners’ 
front, “Social security pension scheme was 
initiated in the state of Madhya Pradesh in 
the year 1981. Our organization was formed 
to deal with the difficulties that the ben-
eficiaries of this scheme (old, disabled, and 
widows) were facing… After the gas leaked 
in 1984… we decided to include the cause of 
the gas victims in our organizational agenda” 
(Scandrett, Mukherjee, Shah and Sen 122-
123).
6 Few studies have been done to understand 
any short or long-term effects from expo-
sures in Institute, WV over the years. 
“We picked up bodies with our own 
hands”
Every time we lifted one up it gave out 
gas.
The bodies had all turned blue, and had 
froth oozing from their mouths.
Eight trucks on duty.
120 bodies into one truck.
Filled and emptied each truck five times 
a day.
For three to four days.
4,800 bodies a day.
In some houses everyone had died. 
They had transformed into morgues
whose locks needed to be broken down.
The fear of a mass epidemic lingered 
about for three to four weeks as
even carcasses of dead animals weren’t 
disposed off.
Kokila Bhattacharya
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When Dow CEO Liveris is asked 
if he will clean up the city, 
where the drinking water of tens 
of thousands is poisoned by 
toxic wastes dumped by Dow 
subsidiary, he said:
“We don’t feel this is our 
responsibility.”
Kokila Bhattacharya
M. Nye & R. Shadaan  |  Solidarity in Struggle
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